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INTRODUCTION 
The Elections Clause1 and Presidential Electors Clause2 are the 
constitutional sources of states’ authority to regulate federal elections.3  
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 1  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (“The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections 
for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature 
thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations . . . .”).   
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The “Swiss army kni[ves]” of federal election law, they also have been 
interpreted as creating special doctrines in a surprisingly broad range of 
fields such as statutory interpretation, preemption, and separation of powers 
in state government, as they relate to federal elections.4 
The Supreme Court’s recent ruling in Arizona State Legislature v. 
Arizona Independent Redistricting Commission (AIRC)5 presents a bold 
new interpretation of the Elections Clause that will reverberate far beyond 
the issue immediately before the Court.  Although the Elections Clause 
confers power specifically on the “Legislature” of each state to regulate 
congressional elections, the Supreme Court held that states may enact 
election laws through any of their “lawmaking processes,” including public 
initiatives and referenda.6  Moreover, a state may completely prohibit its 
institutional legislature from regulating certain aspects of congressional 
elections by conferring that authority on some other entity instead.7  
Applying these holdings, the Court affirmed the validity of a state 
constitutional amendment in Arizona, enacted through a public initiative, 
which transferred authority to draw congressional districts from the state 
legislature to an independent redistricting commission.8 
Most commentary concerning the Court’s ruling focuses on its 
immediate impact of approving the use of independent redistricting 
commissions,9 as seven states have adopted.10  This Essay contends that 
AIRC is a dramatic expansion of precedent based on sweeping reasoning 
that reshapes Elections Clause doctrine in largely unrecognized ways 
 
 2  Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2 (“Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature 
thereof may direct, a Number of Electors [to select the President] . . . .”).   
 3  Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 523 (2001); Bush v. Palm Beach Cty. Canvassing 
Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 76 (2000) (per curiam). 
 4  Michael T. Morley, The Intratextual Independent “Legislature” and the Elections 
Clause, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 847, 848–49 (2015).  
 5  135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015).   
 6  Id. at 2677. 
 7  Id. at 2671 (“[T]he people [of a state] may delegate their legislative authority over 
redistricting to an independent commission just as the representative body may choose to 
do.”) (citing Transcript of Oral Argument at 15–16, AIRC, 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015) (No. 13-
1314)).  
 8  Id. (affirming Arizona’s power to “creat[e] a commission operating independently 
of the state legislature to establish congressional districts”).  
 9  See, e.g., Lyle Denniston, Opinion Analysis: A Cure for Partisan 
Gerrymandering?, SCOTUSBLOG (June 29, 2015, 3:21 PM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2015/06/opinion-analysis-a-cure-for-partisan-gerrymandering/; 
Edward B. Foley, The Constitution Needed a Judicial Assist, OHIO STATE UNIV.: ELECTION 
L. AT MORITZ (June 29, 2015, 2:32 PM), http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/election-
law/article/?article=13151.  
 10  Redistricting Commissions: Congressional Plans, NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE 
LEGISLATURES (Dec. 8, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/redistricting/redistricting-
commissions-congressional-plans.aspx.  
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across a range of other fields.  This Essay offers a critical analysis of the 
“new” Elections Clause and its Article II analogue, the Presidential 
Electors Clause, as they remain in the wake of this tumultuous ruling. 
Part I begins by analyzing the AIRC ruling itself.  Rather than 
interpreting the Elections Clause’s language, the Court attempted to 
implement what it perceived to be the provision’s purpose: facilitating fair 
congressional elections.  This Part argues that the majority opinion is best 
seen as a legal process interpretation,11 but may also be viewed as a failed 
application of John Hart Ely’s representation-reinforcing approach.12  
While the majority opinion is consistent with academic and popular 
opinion concerning redistricting commissions, it was inappropriate given 
the concrete, specific nature of the term being interpreted (“Legislature”), 
and is fundamentally at odds with the political theory underlying the 
Constitution. 
The majority sought to further what it believed to be the Elections 
Clause’s purpose by allowing states to insulate and protect the electoral 
process from politicians.  The Framers, however, believed that the political 
branches themselves are the most important and reliable defenders of 
democracy; they deliberately and repeatedly chose to entrust most critical 
aspects of the electoral process to elected officials.  The majority’s 
approach could have significant implications in future cases involving 
clashes between the political branches and judiciary over the power to 
resolve election disputes and enforce the right to vote. 
Part II turns to AIRC’s impact on Elections Clause and Presidential 
Electors Clause jurisprudence.  Most basically, the ruling allows states to 
completely and permanently exclude their institutional legislatures from 
regulating congressional—and, by extension, presidential—elections, 
subject to no apparent limiting principle.  The ruling also largely settles the 
issue of delegations under those provisions.  It clarifies that, although the 
Elections Clause confers power to craft rules governing congressional 
elections specifically on the “Legislature” of each state, this power may be 
delegated to executive or administrative entities.  It leaves undisturbed the 
Court’s previous holding that the Elections Clause authorizes federal 
preemption of state laws concerning congressional elections, independent 
of the Supremacy Clause, without triggering a presumption against 
preemption.13 
 
 11  See generally HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: 
BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & 
Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (providing the definitive account of the legal process school of 
thought).  
 12  See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980) (explaining 
theory).  
 13  Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2253–54 (2013). 
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Another likely consequence of the Court’s ruling is that, since the 
Presidential Electors Clause will probably be construed in pari materia 
with the Elections Clause, members of the public will be able to use public 
initiatives to reallocate their states’ electoral votes in presidential elections 
on a proportional or district-by-district basis, rather than through the 
prevailing winner-take-all system.  Thus, while AIRC is a congressional 
redistricting case, it could dramatically reshape the landscape of 
presidential politics by putting substantial numbers of electoral votes from 
traditionally partisan strongholds such as California and Michigan in play. 
Finally, and perhaps most significantly, the ruling summarily and 
unnecessarily rejects the “independent state legislature doctrine.”  The 
doctrine provides that, when a legislature enacts a law regulating federal 
elections under the Elections Clause or Presidential Electors Clause, it is 
acting under a higher source of power “independent” of the state 
constitution, and therefore is not subject to substantive state constitutional 
constraints.  Repudiating this doctrine, the Court declared that state laws 
relating to federal elections are subject to both state and federal 
constitutional restrictions, thereby facilitating challenges to provisions such 
as voter ID laws. 
Part III surveys the remaining questions concerning the Elections 
Clause and Presidential Electors Clause that AIRC leaves open.  Perhaps 
the most salient issue is the extent to which these provisions implicitly 
create a special canon of statutory interpretation for state laws governing 
federal elections.  Several courts and commentators have suggested that, 
since these clauses confer authority specifically on state legislatures, rather 
than states as entities, courts must be particularly deferential to the plain 
meaning of laws enacted under them.  Courts may not exercise the same 
interpretive discretion over state laws governing federal elections as they 
may possess in other contexts.14  Although this “super-strong” plain 
meaning approach has been criticized,15 it is a fair and fundamentally 
important principle that limits courts’ ability to “interpret” the law, after the 
results of an election are known and a concrete dispute has arisen, to 
achieve their preferred electoral outcomes. 
As the Court’s ruling focused primarily on separation of powers at the 
state level, it also leaves unaddressed some federalism-related issues.  
Because the Presidential Electors Clause does not expressly authorize 
Congress to legislate concerning presidential elections, it remains possible 
that federal authority in that area is more limited than with congressional 
elections.  It is also unclear whether Printz v. United States’s constraints on 
 
 14  See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 112–13 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) 
(concluding that, because the Constitution delegates plenary authority over presidential 
elections to state legislatures, “the text of [an] election law itself . . . takes on independent 
significance”). 
 15  See Richard L. Hasen, The Democracy Canon, 62 STAN. L. REV. 69 (2009).  
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commandeering limit Congress’s power to direct state and local officials in 
their conduct of federal (or state) elections.16  Finally, the Court has held 
that the Elections Clause implicitly prohibits states from enacting laws 
designed to benefit or hinder certain candidates.17  The Court has yet to 
fully flesh out the scope of this important limit on states’ authority over 
federal elections. 
The Elections Clause and Presidential Electors Clause are the sources 
of a wide range of constitutional doctrines concerning federal elections.  
While AIRC, on its face, addresses only the meaning of “Legislature” in the 
Elections Clause and the validity of redistricting commissions, the Court’s 
broad reasoning sweeps much further.  This Essay offers a first analysis of 
the “new” Elections Clause in the wake of this ruling. 
I.     ARIZONA INDEPENDENT REDISTRICTING COMMISSION 
In AIRC, the Court adopted a sweeping interpretation of the Elections 
Clause, despite other available lines of reasoning that would have permitted 
it to reach comparable conclusions on narrower grounds.  Section A 
discusses the breadth of the ruling, demonstrating that the Court adopted a 
particularly far-reaching interpretation of the Elections Clause.  Section B 
explains that the Court’s approach is best understood as a legal process 
interpretation of the clause, which was a particularly questionable approach 
given the nature of that provision.  Finally, Section C shows that the 
political theory underlying the Court’s ruling is fundamentally at odds with 
that which permeates the Constitution. 
A.   Breadth of the Ruling 
The Elections Clause provides, “The Times, Places and Manner of 
holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in 
each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by 
Law make or alter such Regulations.”18  The people of Arizona enacted an 
initiative amending their state constitution to transfer authority to determine 
congressional district boundaries from the institutional legislature to a 
 
 16  521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997).  
 17  U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 833–34 (1995) (“[T]he Framers 
understood the Elections Clause as a grant of authority to issue procedural regulations, and 
not as a source of power to dictate electoral outcomes, to favor or disfavor a class of 
candidates, or to evade important constitutional restraints.”); see, e.g., Cook v. Gralike, 531 
U.S. 510, 524 (2001) (holding that the Elections Clause did not authorize a state to enact a 
law “plainly designed to favor candidates who are willing to support the particular form of a 
term limits amendment set forth in its text and to disfavor those who either oppose term 
limits entirely or would prefer a different proposal”).  
 18  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1 (emphasis added). 
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bipartisan commission.19  The amendment raised two serious questions 
under the Elections Clause.  First, from a purely procedural perspective, the 
Elections Clause permits only the “Legislature” to enact laws regulating 
federal elections.  The redistricting commission, however, was created by a 
constitutional amendment that was directly enacted by the people of the 
state through a public initiative, rather than the legislature.  Second, 
substantively, putting aside the manner in which the amendment was 
enacted, it strips the legislature of its authority to craft congressional 
districts and vests that power instead in an independent commission.  The 
appellant,20 the Arizona state legislature, challenged the amendment solely 
on substantive grounds, foregoing any procedural arguments.21  The 
Court’s ruling, however, swept aside objections of either type. 
Even if the Court did not wish to adopt the appellant’s22 and 
dissent’s23 position that independent redistricting commissions are 
categorically unconstitutional, it could have reached any number of 
moderate or compromise rulings.  For example, it could have held that, 
although the Elections Clause confers authority to regulate federal elections 
specifically on institutional state legislatures, the legislature may delegate 
that power to other entities, such as independent commissions.  This 
approach would have validated the procedural objection to Arizona’s 
commission, since Arizona’s institutional legislature was not involved in 
the creation of the state’s redistricting commission, while rejecting the 
substantive one. 
From a policy perspective, it might be objected that legislatures would 
refuse to voluntarily relinquish their power over redistricting.  Four of the 
seven current congressional redistricting commissions, however, were 
established by state legislatures and subsequently ratified by voters.24  A 
fifth stemmed directly from a constitutional convention.25  Only two 
congressional redistricting commissions were created through public 
 
 19  ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, § 1.  
 20  The case was an appeal from a three-judge panel of the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Arizona directly to the U.S. Supreme Court.  AIRC, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2662 
(2015); see 28 U.S.C. § 2284(a) (2012). 
 21  Brief for Appellant at 24, 36, AIRC, 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015) (No. 13-1314).  
 22  Id.; see also Morley, supra note 4 (presenting intratextual argument against validity 
of the Arizona commission).  
 23  AIRC, 135 S. Ct. at 2678 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 24  See Act of Nov. 7, 1995, 206th Leg., Second Ann. Sess., 1995 N.J. Laws 2510 
(codified at N.J. CONST. art. IV, § 3); S.J. Res. 105, 52nd Leg., First Reg. Sess., 1993 Idaho 
Sess. Laws 1530 (codified at IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 2); H.B. 2322, 16th Leg., Reg. Sess., 
1992 Hawaii Sess. Laws 1029 (codified at HAW. CONST. art. IV, § 2); S.J. Res. 103, 48th 
Leg., Reg. Sess., 1983 Wash. Sess. Laws 2202 (codified at WASH. CONST. art. II, § 43).  
 25  See MONT. CONST., art. V, § 14(2).   
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initiatives.26  Interpreting the Elections Clause as referring exclusively to 
institutional legislatures therefore would have preserved the majority of 
commissions that presently exist and realistically left the door open to the 
creation of others. 
Alternatively, the Court could have modified its holding by declaring 
that, while the term “Legislature” refers to any entity or process to which a 
state constitution commits “legislative authority,”27 a state is not free to 
exclude its “actual” institutional legislature from that definition.  In other 
words, the Court could have interpreted “Legislature” to refer to the 
institutional legislature, as well as any other processes or entities through 
which the state constitution allows election laws or redistricting plans to be 
adopted (including either public initiative or approval by a redistricting 
commission).  This view would have been consistent with the Court’s 
Elections Clause precedents, which upheld the use of public referenda28 
and gubernatorial vetoes29 without categorically excluding institutional 
legislatures from regulating any aspect of federal elections. 
Such reasoning would have led the Court to reject the procedural 
objection to the Arizona commission, because state laws concerning federal 
elections may be enacted through public initiative.  It would have upheld 
the substantive challenge, however, because the state constitutional 
amendment completely excluded the institutional legislature from 
participating in redistricting.  The Court might have felt that this 
interpretation still would have allowed the institutional legislature to 
maintain too much control over the redistricting process and other aspects 
of federal elections.  Such concerns could have been alleviated, however, 
by state constitutional provisions limiting a legislature’s ability to override 
or nullify the outcome of a public initiative30 or determination of a 
redistricting commission. 
 
 26  See Proposition 20, CAL. SEC’Y OF STATE (Nov. 2010) (codified at CAL. CONST. art. 
XXI), http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2010/general/pdf/english/text-proposed-laws.pdf#prop20; 
Proposition 106, ARIZ. SEC’Y OF STATE (Sept. 2000) (codified at ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 2, 
§ 1), http://apps.azsos.gov/election/2000/Info/pubpamphlet/english/prop106.pdf.  
 27  See AIRC, 135 S. Ct. at 2668 n.17, 2671. 
 28  Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565, 569 (1916).  
 29  Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 365–66 (1932).  
 30  Indeed, state constitutional provisions authorizing initiatives already contain such 
restrictions.  See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. 1, § 1(6)(B)–(C) (prohibiting the legislature 
from “repeal[ing] an initiative measure approved by a majority of the votes cast thereon,” 
and requiring a three-fourths vote of the legislature to amend a measure adopted by 
initiative); CAL. CONST. art. II, § 10(c) (“[The Legislature] may amend or repeal an initiative 
statute by another statute that becomes effective only when approved by the electors unless 
the initiative statute permits amendment or repeal without their approval.”); cf. ARK. CONST. 
art. V, § 1 (requiring a two-thirds vote to amend or repeal any measure adopted by 
initiative).   
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Finally, the Court also could have adopted a broad reading of 
“Legislature,” as referring to any entity or process through which a state’s 
lawmaking authority is exercised, while holding that the Elections Clause 
implicitly prohibits delegation of that power.  Thus, while the Elections 
Clause allows the people of a state to adopt a redistricting plan via public 
initiative—which is one of the state’s lawmaking processes—they could 
not permit an independent commission to do so.  By way of comparison, 
the Constitution, as originally enacted, empowered state legislatures to 
appoint U.S. Senators;31 it likely would have been unconstitutional for a 
legislature to transfer that authority to an executive agency or independent 
commission.32 
This interpretation would have been bolstered by the fact that, unlike 
other constitutional provisions which refer to states as overall entities, the 
Elections Clause specifically confers responsibility for regulating federal 
elections on state legislatures in particular.  Such a direct delegation to a 
particular branch of state government reasonably could be construed as 
implicitly prohibiting that branch from delegating that power to some other 
entity.  The AIRC Court summarily rejected this possibility, based solely on 
a concession from appellant’s counsel.33 
Rather than any of these narrower, compromise possibilities, the Court 
instead adopted a sweepingly broad interpretation of the Elections Clause 
that went far beyond precedent.  At most,34 Ohio ex rel. Davis v. 
Hildebrant authorized a state’s voters to enact measures concerning federal 
elections through legislative channels in addition to the state legislature, 
such as public initiatives or referenda.35  And Smiley v. Holm clarified that, 
when such laws are enacted by the institutional legislature, they remain 
subject to gubernatorial veto.36  Neither of those cases compels the 
 
 31  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 1. 
 32  See, e.g., State ex rel. Van Alstine v. Frear, 125 N.W. 961, 971 (Wis. 1910) 
(rejecting pre–Seventeenth Amendment challenge to non-binding public referendum on U.S. 
Senate candidates, because legislators retained their power and obligation to “exercise their 
conscientious judgments” on the issue); State ex rel. McCue v. Blaisdell, 118 N.W. 141, 147 
(N.D. 1908) (same, because “[t]he Legislature still elects the senator, and the act merely 
gives the voters of each party an opportunity to express their choice of candidates”).  See 
generally Derek T. Muller, Legislative Delegations and the Elections Clause, FLA. ST. U. L. 
REV. (forthcoming) (manuscript at 5–8), http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract_id=2650432. 
 33  AIRC, 135 S. Ct. at 2671 (“[T]he people may delegate their legislative authority 
over redistricting to an independent commission just as the representative body may choose 
to do.”) (citing Transcript of Oral Argument at 15–16, AIRC, 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015) (No. 
13-1314)).   
 34  I have argued elsewhere that the Hildebrant Court actually did not reach the merits 
of the petitioners’ Elections Clause claim, construing it instead as a non-justiciable 
Guarantee Clause argument.  Morley, supra note 4, at 861.  
 35  241 U.S. 565, 569 (1916). 
 36  285 U.S. 355, 365–66 (1932). 
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conclusion that the Elections Clause permits a state’s voters to completely 
exclude an institutional legislature from regulating any aspects of federal 
elections.37 
Importantly, the Court’s ruling contains no limiting principle.  
Nothing in the opinion turned on the fact that the commission was 
empowered to determine congressional district boundaries, as opposed to 
regulating other aspects of federal elections.  Since the Court repeatedly 
denied that the Elections Clause’s reference to “Legislature” refers to the 
institutional legislature,38 it does not appear there is any core nucleus of 
authority over federal elections that a state’s actual legislature must retain.  
To the contrary, under the Court’s reasoning, the people of a state may 
completely exclude their institutional legislature from regulating all aspects 
of federal elections, delegating that authority instead to the Secretary of 
State, an executive agency, or an independent commission, among other 
possibilities. This is an extremely odd and unsatisfying interpretation of a 
constitutional provision expressly specifying that “[t]he Times, Places and 
Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be 
prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof.”39  In the Court’s view, 
this clause effectively means “The Constitution of a State may prohibit the 
Legislature from prescribing the Times, Places and Manner of holding 
Elections for Senators and Representatives.” 
B.   Competing Theories of Constitutional Interpretation 
The majority opinion and principal dissent in AIRC dramatically 
illustrate diametrically opposed theories of constitutional interpretation.  
The dissent relies on textualism, by focusing on the meaning of the word 
“Legislature” as used in the Elections Clause;40 intratextualism, by 
considering how other clauses in the Constitution use that term;41 and 
original understanding.42  While the majority makes a desultory attempt at 
 
 37  Cf. AIRC, 135 S. Ct. at 2671 (“[T]he Elections Clause permits the people of 
Arizona to provide for redistricting by . . . a commission operating independently of the 
state legislature . . . .”).   
 38  See id. at 2671–75. 
 39  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.  
 40  AIRC, 135 S. Ct. at 2679 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (explaining that Founding Era 
dictionaries demonstrate that “‘the Legislature’ referred to an institutional body of 
representatives, not the people at large”). 
 41  Id. at 2680–83 (“The unambiguous meaning of ‘the Legislature’ in the Elections 
Clause as a representative body is confirmed by other provisions of the Constitution that use 
the same term in the same way.”); see also Morley, supra note 4 (setting forth a detailed 
intratextual analysis of the Elections Clause).  See generally Akhil Reed Amar, 
Intratextualism, 112 HARV. L. REV. 747 (1999) (explaining intratextualism).  
 42  AIRC, 135 S. Ct. at 2684 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“The history of the Elections 
Clause further supports the conclusion that ‘the Legislature’ is a representative body.”). 
88 N O T R E  D A M E  L A W  R E V I E W  O N L I N E  [VOL. 91:2 
demonstrating that the term “Legislature” actually refers to something other 
than a state’s institutional legislature,43 most of the opinion provides a non-
interpretivist, legal process interpretation of the Elections Clause. 
The leading theorists of the legal process school, Henry M. Hart, Jr. 
and Albert M. Sacks, presented their theory solely as one of statutory 
interpretation, but prominent commentators have gone on to apply it to 
constitutional law, as well.44  Hart and Sacks contend that, when construing 
a legal text, “[t]he first task . . . is to determine what purpose ought to be 
attributed to it.”45  They explain that legal enactments “ought always to be 
presumed to be the work of reasonable men pursuing reasonable purposes 
reasonably.”46  When a law’s actual purpose is unclear, a court may attempt 
to reconstruct what the purpose of a reasonable legislator would have 
been.47  Thus, to apply a statutory or constitutional provision under the 
legal process approach, a court must seek to implement its underlying 
purpose, whether actual or constructive. 
The AIRC majority believed that “[t]he dominant purpose of the 
Elections Clause . . . was to empower Congress to override state election 
rules, not to restrict the way States enact legislation.”48  It was intended to 
ensure that state officials did not attempt to manipulate the outcomes of 
federal elections.49  Particularly since “the initiative and the referendum . . . 
were not yet in our democracy’s arsenal” when the Elections Clause was 
drafted, its reference to “Legislatures” could not have been intended to 
prevent states’ electorates from regulating federal elections through such 
means.50 
The legal process school also stresses institutional competence.  Each 
organ of government has its own structure and processes, and therefore is 
uniquely competent to handle certain kinds of issues.51  Consistent with this 
insight, the AIRC majority extolled the importance of independent 
 
 43  Id. at 2671 (discussing the definition of “Legislature” in Founding Era 
dictionaries).  
 44  William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Making of The Legal Process, 
107 HARV. L. REV. 2031, 2052 (1994).  
 45  HART & SACKS, supra note 11, at 1125 (emphasis removed); see also id. at 1374 
(advocating that courts should “[i]nterpret the words of the statute immediately in question 
so as to carry out the purpose as best it can”). 
 46  Id. at 1125.  
 47  See id. at 1374, 1378.  
 48  AIRC, 135 S. Ct. at 2672.   
 49  Id.  
 50  Id.   
 51  HART & SACKS, supra note 11, at 4 (“[D]ifferent procedures and personnel of 
different qualifications invariably prove to be appropriate for deciding different kinds of 
questions.”); see also id. at 160.  
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commissions in combatting political gerrymandering by legislatures.52  The 
Court strained to construe the Elections Clause so as to allow states to 
assign responsibility for redistricting to what the Court perceived to be the 
most appropriate institution for the task.  Had the majority shared the Chief 
Justice’s doubts about redistricting commissions,53 it might have adopted a 
less aggressive interpretation of the Elections Clause. 
The Court’s reasoning is vulnerable to the standard objections to legal 
process interpretations.  Legal process theory treats the legislative 
process—and, by extension, the constitutional drafting process—as 
fundamentally rational.  Public choice theory convincingly demonstrates, 
however, that deliberations of lawmaking bodies are chaotic, path-
dependent, and fraught with tradeoffs, negotiations, and compromises.54  
By attempting to further the purpose underlying a legal provision, rather 
than enforcing its plain meaning, a court is implementing a rule that has not 
actually survived the bicameral legislative process or constitutional 
ratification process.  As Professor John F. Manning notes, 
[i]f the Court feels free to adjust the semantic meaning of [a legal 
provision] when the rules embedded in the text seem awkward in 
relation to the [provision’s] apparent goals, then legislators cannot 
reliably use words to articulate the boundaries of the frequently 
awkward compromises that are necessary to secure a [measure’s] 
enactment.55 
The work of John Hart Ely—who was by no means a strict 
textualist—suggests another, more targeted objection.  He argued that 
courts cannot interpret certain provisions of the Constitution, such as 
“privileges and immunities” and “equal protection,” based solely on their 
plain text, because the language is too vague.56  His representation 
reinforcement theory counsels courts to construe such broad phrases in a 
manner that will keep open the “channels of political change” and protect 
“discrete and insular minorities” from oppression.57  The AIRC majority 
 
 52  AIRC, 135 S. Ct. at 2677 (explaining that Arizona’s voters sought to “restore ‘the 
core principle of republican government’” by “turn[ing] to the initiative to curb the practice 
of gerrymandering” (quoting Mitchell N. Berman, Managing Gerrymandering, 83 TEX. L. 
REV. 781 (2005))); see also id. at 2676 (emphasizing that independent commissions “have 
succeeded to a great degree” in combatting political conflicts of interest (quoting Bruce E. 
Cain, Redistricting Commissions: A Better Political Buffer?, 121 YALE L.J. 1808, 1808 
(2012))).  
 53  Id. at 2691 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (discussing the “partisanship” that has 
infected Arizona’s commission).  
 54  Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 547 (1983); see 
also William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 640–44 (1990).  
 55  John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. 
REV. 70, 111 (2006).   
 56  ELY, supra note 12, at 11–14.   
 57  Id. at 103 & n.97.  
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likely would enthusiastically agree that its opinion adopts a representation-
reinforcing approach, because its whole purpose is to allow states to take 
steps to prevent politicians from drawing congressional district lines on a 
partisan basis, for the benefit of entrenched incumbents.58 
Even apart from the Chief Justice’s empirical concerns about the 
impartiality and fairness of purportedly independent commissions,59 the 
majority opinion fails as an attempt at representation reinforcement for one 
fundamental reason: the term “Legislature” is not the type of broad 
provision embodying general principles that calls for some outside moral or 
political theory to meaningfully implement.60  It is a concrete term, used 
repeatedly throughout the Constitution itself, most state constitutions 
during the Founding Era, and the constitutional convention.  The nature and 
context of these references demonstrate that it refers to a specific entity 
within each state: a body comprised of elected representatives with general, 
statewide lawmaking authority that periodically convenes.61 
C.   A New Political Theory 
The most significant impact of the majority’s approach is that it 
wholeheartedly embraces a political theory concerning the electoral process 
that is fundamentally at odds with the one underlying the Constitution 
itself.  Whether viewed from a legal process or representation-reinforcing 
perspective,62 the majority opinion rests on the view that legislatures 
cannot be trusted with redistricting authority, because they have structural 
incentives to succumb to the temptation of political gerrymandering.63  
Indeed, the majority goes so far as to completely ignore the U.S. House of 
Representatives’s interpretation of the Elections Clause in resolving an 
election contest, dismissing it as a largely party-lines vote.64 
The Framers, however, were of a very different view.  They believed 
that Congress was the only entity that could be “trusted” with control over 
 
 58  See supra notes 48–49 and accompanying text.   
 59  See supra note 53.  
 60  AIRC, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2689–90 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 61  Morley, supra note 4.  
 62  See supra Section I.B.  
 63  See supra note 52.  
 64  AIRC, 135 S. Ct. at 2674 (declaring that the House’s interpretation of the Elections 
Clause in Baldwin v. Trowbridge, 2 Bartlett Contested Election Cases, H.R. Misc. Doc. No. 
152, 41st Cong., 2d Sess., 46–47 (1866), “is not a disposition that should attract this Court’s 
reliance”).  The majority did not acknowledge the numerous other authorities that agreed 
with the House’s conclusion that the Elections Clause confers powers specifically on 
institutional state legislatures.  See Michael T. Morley, Rethinking the Right to Vote Under 
State Constitutions, 67 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 189, 198–202 (2014) (citing cases).  
2016] T H E  N E W  E L E C T I O N S  C L A U S E  91 
the electoral process.65  Justice Story explains that lodging authority over 
congressional elections in any entity other than Congress itself would 
undermine “its independence, its purity, and even its existence.”66  By 
granting Congress power over congressional elections, the “major evil of 
interference by other branches of government is entirely avoided, while a 
substantial degree of responsibility is still provided by regular elections, the 
interim demands of public opinion, and the desire of each House to 
preserve its standing in relation to the other institutions of government.”67 
Even aside from Congress’s authority to make rules concerning 
congressional elections under the Elections Clause,68 each House of 
Congress has sole authority to determine the elections and returns of its 
members69 and to effectively nullify the outcomes of elections by expelling 
members.70  Congress is likewise responsible for determining the outcome 
of presidential elections.  The House and Senate have power to count 
electoral votes,71 including the authority to reject votes they deem invalid.72  
In the event that a candidate for President or Vice President fails to receive 
a majority of electoral votes, as determined by Congress, then the House or 
Senate, respectively, determine the winner of that office.73  The House also 
has the power to impeach federal officers,74 and the Senate is responsible 
for trying all impeachments.75 
Allowing Congress to control and even determine the outcomes of 
federal elections creates a substantial risk of direct partisan manipulation.  
Yet the Constitution’s structure embodies the Framers’ repeated, deliberate 
decisions to entrust Congress with such responsibility.  Although the 
Court’s skepticism of allowing the political branches to control the 
 
 65  1 JAMES KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 220 (Legal Classics Library 
1986) (1826); cf. WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 47 
(photo. reprint 2003) (2d ed. 1829) (discussing the need of legislative bodies to be able to 
defend themselves from encroachments and interference).  
 66  2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 831, at 295 (Bos., Hilliard, Gray & Co. 1833).  
 67  Morgan v. United States, 801 F.2d 445, 450 (D.C. Cir. 1986). 
 68  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1. 
 69  Id. art. I, § 5, cl. 1; see, e.g., Morgan, 801 F.2d at 450; McIntyre v. Fallahay, 766 
F.2d 1078 (7th Cir. 1985).   
 70  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2.  
 71  Id. amend. XII.   
 72  3 U.S.C. § 15 (2012) (allowing Members of Congress to object to the counting of 
particular electoral votes).  
 73  U.S. CONST. amend. XII.  
 74  Id. art. I, § 2, cl. 5.  
 75  Id. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.  
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electoral process has a valid basis and is widely shared,76 it runs contrary to 
the political theory embedded in the Constitution itself. 
The Court’s willingness to reinterpret even a clear and concrete 
provision such as the Elections Clause in light of its skepticism about the 
political branches’ ability to fairly handle election-related issues raises 
questions over the extent to which the Court will defer to Congress’s 
resolution of disputes that more directly impact the right to vote.  The same 
fairness concerns that led the Court to permit entities other than a state’s 
institutional legislature to redraw congressional districts might similarly 
motivate it to permit entities other than the respective Houses of Congress 
to determine which congressional candidates should be seated or which 
electoral votes should be counted.  Thus, the theory underlying AIRC sets 
the stage for greater judicial enforcement of the constitutional right to vote 
and a potential clash with Congress over the scope of its constitutional 
prerogatives. 
II.     COLLATERAL IMPACT ON FEDERAL ELECTION LAW 
Although AIRC’s most immediate consequence is to establish the 
constitutionality of redistricting commissions, the Court’s ruling also 
impacts Elections Clause jurisprudence in a variety of other, potentially 
further-reaching ways.  Section A explains that a state legislature—defined 
broadly as including any process or entity that a state constitution 
authorizes to exercise legislative authority—may delegate power over 
federal elections to other organs of government.  Section B discusses the 
Court’s summary rejection of the independent state legislature doctrine.  
And Section C examines AIRC’s implications for states’ rules for allocating 
presidential electors among candidates.  As mentioned earlier, AIRC left 
undisturbed the Court’s earlier holding that federal laws enacted pursuant 
to the Elections Clause which preempt state statutes governing 
congressional elections are not subject to a presumption against 
preemption.77 
 
 76  See, e.g., ELY, supra note 12; Nicholas Stephanopoulos, Reforming Redistricting: 
Why Popular Initiatives to Establish Redistricting Commissions Succeed or Fail, 23 J.L. & 
POL. 331, 333 (2007) (embracing independent commissions as “the only realistic way to 
curb political gerrymandering”); Jeffrey C. Kubin, Note, The Case for Redistricting 
Commissions, 75 TEX. L. REV. 837, 838 (1997) (“[W]hile commissions are no panacea, they 
offer a viable means of restoring a degree of efficiency, fairness, and finality to a state’s 
decennial gerrymander.”); cf. Cain, supra note 52, at 1842–43 (offering recommendations to 
improve commissions).  
 77  Arizona v. Inter Tribal Council of Ariz., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2247, 2253–54 (2013). 
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A.   Non-Delegation Doctrine 
The AIRC Court not only adopted an expansive interpretation of 
“Legislature,” but held that any process or entity that qualifies as a 
legislature may delegate its power under the Elections Clause to other 
organs of state government.78  Interestingly, the Court did not cite any 
authority or offer any analysis in support of its holding, but rather rested 
this conclusion exclusively on a concession by appellant’s counsel.79 
Prior to this ruling, courts had periodically wrestled with delegation 
issues under the Elections Clause.  Recognizing that the Elections Clause is 
one of the Constitution’s only provisions that “confers a power on a 
particular branch of a State’s government,”80 some courts had suggested 
that the provision might implicitly bar legislatures from transferring that 
power to other entities, or substantially restrict legislatures’ ability to make 
such delegations.81 
The AIRC Court held that the power to regulate federal elections is 
fully delegable.  Because the Elections Clause confers power on both 
legislatures and Congress, it is reasonable to assume that the same 
limitations on delegation apply to both entities.  In general, Congress may 
delegate its powers so long as it cabins the agency’s discretion based on an 
“intelligible principle.”82  The Supreme Court has upheld every 
congressional delegation of authority it has encountered over the past 
 
 78  AIRC, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2671 (2015) (“[T]he people may delegate their legislative 
authority over redistricting to an independent commission just as the representative body 
may choose to do.”) (citing Transcript of Oral Argument at 15–16, AIRC, 135 S. Ct. 2652 
(2015) (No. 13-1314)).  
 79  Id.   
 80  Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 112 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).  
 81  See, e.g., Green Party of Tenn. v. Hargett, 882 F. Supp. 2d 959, 1017–18 (M.D. 
Tenn. 2012) (“[G]iven the absence of statutory standards for the exercise of the State 
Elections Coordinator’s discretion,” a state law authorizing the coordinator to develop 
criteria for determining whether a group qualifies as a minor political party is not “a 
permissible delegation of legislative authority.”), rev’d 700 F.3d 816 (6th Cir. 2012).  Of 
course, it still would violate the Elections Clause for an organ of state government to 
attempt to regulate federal elections in the absence of a delegation from an entity or process 
that qualifies as a “Legislature.”  See Libertarian Party of Ohio v. Brunner, 567 F. Supp. 2d 
1006, 1012 (S.D. Ohio 2008) (“Even if the Ohio General Assembly could delegate its 
authority to a member of the executive branch . . . , there is no evidence that the state 
legislature has specifically delegated its authority to Defendant to direct the manner in 
which [federal elections are conducted].”); Grills v. Branigin, 284 F. Supp. 176, 180 (S.D. 
Ind. 1968) (“[The Elections Clause] clearly does not authorize the defendants, as members 
of the Election Board of Indiana, to create congressional districts.  This power is granted to 
the Indiana General Assembly . . . .”), aff’d Branigin v. Duddleston, 391 U.S. 364 (1968). 
 82  Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (quoting J.W. 
Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)).  
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eighty years.83  It has approved delegations based on exceedingly vague 
criteria, allowing agencies to set standards that are “fair and equitable”84 or 
that serve “the public interest, convenience, or necessity.”85  Based on these 
precedents, most commentators contend that the non-delegation doctrine is 
effectively dead,86 and surprisingly few mourn its loss.87 
The Court has never directly addressed whether the Elections Clause 
imposes any constraints on the power of state legislatures or Congress to 
delegate their authority to regulate federal elections.  Even assuming that 
some limit exists, it is likely nothing more than the “intelligible principle” 
standard to which other delegations of federal legislative authority are 
subject.88  Thus, it will be virtually impossible for a litigant to successfully 
challenge even sweeping and effectively standardless delegations by 
legislatures over election-related regulations to independent commissions, 
executive officials, administrative agencies, or local entities. 
B.   Independent State Legislature Doctrine 
Aside from its approval of redistricting commissions, perhaps the 
most important and far-reaching aspect of AIRC was the Court’s summary 
rejection of the independent state legislature doctrine.  The doctrine 
recognizes that, when a legislature enacts a law that applies to federal 
elections, it is acting “by virtue of a direct grant of authority” from the 
Elections Clause and Presidential Electors Clause.89  Thus, 
 
 83  Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 315 (2000); cf. 
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541–42 (1935); Panama 
Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 420–21 (1935). 
 84  Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 423 (1944).  
 85  NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 216 (1943). 
 86  Richard D. Cudahy, The Nondelegation Doctrine: Rumors of Its Resurrection 
Prove Unfounded, 16 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 1, 39 (2002) (“It will certainly be a 
long time before a court of appeals is once again moved to bring the doctrine out from the 
shadows into the sunlight.”). 
 87  See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation 
to Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2165 (2004) (“[T]he nondelegation 
doctrine, as a general requirement that Congress must circumscribe the discretion of 
administrative agencies, should be rejected.”); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring 
the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721, 1722 (2002) (“The nondelegation 
position lacks any foundation in constitutional text and structure, in standard originalist 
sources, or in sound economic and political theory.”); cf. Sunstein, supra note 83, at 315–16 
(arguing that nondelegation canons of statutory interpretation, rather than a substantive 
nondelegation doctrine, exist). 
 88  Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (quoting J.W. 
Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)).   
 89  Bush v. Palm Beach Cty. Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 76 (2000) (per curiam); see 
also supra note 3 and accompanying text.   
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     Although laws governing federal elections must be enacted through 
the “legislative process” set forth in the state constitution, . . . a state 
constitution cannot restrict the [substantive] scope of the power and 
discretion that the U.S. Constitution bestows on the state legislature to 
regulate the manner in which federal elections are conducted.90 
As the Supreme Court stated in McPherson v. Blacker, the 
Constitution’s delegations specifically to state legislatures of power to 
regulate federal elections “operat[e] as a limitation upon the State in respect 
of any attempt to circumscribe th[at] legislative power,” including through 
“any provision in the state constitution in that regard.”91 
Under the independent state legislature doctrine, if a state law 
concerning federal elections conflicts with a state constitution, the law 
prevails.  For example, in In re Plurality Elections, a Rhode Island statute 
required a candidate for federal office to receive only a plurality of votes in 
order to win.92  The state constitution, in contrast, required candidates for 
public office to receive a majority of votes to prevail.93  The Rhode Island 
Supreme Court held that, because state legislatures act pursuant to their 
authority under the U.S. Constitution when enacting laws regulating federal 
elections, the law was enforceable regardless of any contrary provision in 
the state constitution.94  Numerous other courts95 and commentators96 have 
recognized and applied the doctrine. 
Without so much as acknowledging any of these authorities—
including the Court’s own statement in McPherson—the AIRC majority 
summarily repudiated the doctrine.  It held, “Nothing in th[e] [Elections] 
Clause instructs, nor has this Court ever held, that a state legislature may 
prescribe regulations on the time, place, and manner of holding federal 
elections in defiance of provisions of the State’s constitution.”97  As 
 
 90  Morley, supra note 64, at 199–200 (quoting Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 368 
(1932)).   
 91  146 U.S. 1, 25 (1892). 
 92  8 A. 881, 882 (R.I. 1887). 
 93  Id.  
 94  Id. at 881–82.  
 95  E.g., PG Publ. Co. v. Aichele, 902 F. Supp. 2d 724, 747–48 (W.D. Pa. 2012), aff’d 
on other grounds, 705 F.3d 91 (3d Cir. 2013); State ex rel. Beeson v. Marsh, 34 N.W.2d 
279, 286–87 (Neb. 1948); In re Opinions of Justices, 45 N.H. 595, 601 (1864); see also 
Commonwealth ex rel. Dummit v. O’Connell, 181 S.W.2d 691, 695 (Ky. Ct. App. 1944).  
 96  Walter Clark, The Electoral College and Presidential Suffrage, 65 U. PA. L. REV. 
737, 741 (1917); Richard D. Friedman, Trying to Make Peace with Bush v. Gore, 29 FLA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 811, 835 (2001); James C. Kirby, Jr., Limitations on the Power of State 
Legislatures over Presidential Elections, 27 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 495, 504 (1962); 
Morley, supra note 64, at 198–204; Emory Widener, Jr., Note, The Virginia Absent Voters 
System, 8 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 36, 37 (1951); Note, Limitations on Access to the General 
Election Ballot, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 86, 87 (1937).   
 97  AIRC, 135 S. Ct. 2652, 2673 (2015). 
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mentioned earlier, the Court dismissed the House of Representatives’s 
endorsement and application of the independent state legislature doctrine as 
a largely partisan maneuver,98 and completely ignored a Senate committee 
report recognizing the doctrine.99 
Under the majority’s ruling, a state legislature (as well as other entity 
or process that qualifies as a “Legislature” under the Elections Clause) is 
bound by substantive restrictions set forth in the state constitution when 
enacting laws governing federal elections.  Such laws, such as proof-of-
citizenship or voter identification requirements, may therefore be 
challenged on state, as well as federal, constitutional grounds.100  The Court 
thus has ratified additional barriers to state efforts to protect the integrity of 
federal elections. 
C.   Reallocating Presidential Electors 
The AIRC Court’s interpretation of the Elections Clause likely applies 
to the Presidential Electors Clause as well, as the two provisions are 
typically read in pari materia.101  Just as the Elections Clause empowers 
the state “Legislature” to regulate the time, place, and manner of 
congressional elections,102 the Presidential Electors Clause grants the 
“Legislature” power to regulate the process for choosing presidential 
electors.103  The AIRC majority interpreted the term legislature in the 
Elections Clause to include public initiatives and referenda.  It is likely to 
interpret the Presidential Electors Clause the same way. 
Commentators have long debated the constitutionality of reallocating 
a state’s electoral votes for President through a public initiative or 
referendum.104  Under AIRC, voters likely may use the public initiative 
 
 98  Id. at 2674.  
 99  See S. REP. NO. 43-395, at 9 (1874). 
 100  See Joshua A. Douglas, The Right to Vote Under State Constitutions, 67 VAND. L. 
REV. 89, 104–05 (2014); see also William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the 
Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 502 (1977); cf. Morley, supra note 
64, at 190 (“The standards that the modern Supreme Court has adopted for determining the 
constitutionality of election laws are consistent with over a century-and-a-half of state 
constitutional precedents that long predate most federal voting rights cases.”).   
 101  See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 124 n.7 (1970) (Black, J., announcing the 
judgment of the Court) (“It cannot be seriously contended that Congress has less power over 
the conduct of presidential elections than it has over congressional elections.”); see also 
Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 544–45 (1934).  
 102  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.  
 103  Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.  
 104  Compare Michael McLaughlin, Note, Direct Democracy and the Electoral 
College: Can a Popular Initiative Change How a State Appoints Its Electors?, 76 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 2943, 3000 (2008) (arguing that initiatives may not be used to change state laws 
relating to federal elections), and Nicholas P. Stabile, Comment, An End Run Around a 
Representative Democracy?  The Unconstitutionality of a Ballot Initiative to Alter the 
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process to change the way in which states allocate their electoral votes in 
presidential elections.  All states except for Nebraska105 and Maine106 
allocate their electoral votes on a winner-take-all basis, meaning that the 
presidential candidate who receives a plurality of the state’s popular vote 
receives all of that state’s electoral votes.  For example, in the 2012 
election, Barack Obama received 60.24% of the popular vote in California, 
yet was awarded all 55 of that state’s electoral votes.107 
At least three main alternatives exist.  States could follow the example 
of Nebraska and Maine by awarding presidential electors on a district-by-
district basis to the presidential candidate who receives the most votes in 
each congressional district.108  The candidate who receives the most 
statewide votes would be awarded the state’s two additional electors.  
Under this system, Obama would have received 43 of California’s electoral 
votes, and Romney would have received 12.109  Alternatively, a state’s 
electors could be awarded in proportion to the percentage of the statewide 
popular vote received by each candidate who exceeds some minimum 
threshold.  Under this approach, California would have awarded 34 of its 
electoral votes to Obama, and 21 to Romney.110  Some commentators 
 
Method of Distributing Electors, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 1495 (2009), with Vikram David 
Amar, Direct Democracy and Article II: Additional Thoughts on Initiatives and Presidential 
Elections, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 631, 641 (2008), and David S. Wagner, Note, The 
Forgotten Avenue of Reform: The Role of States in Electoral College Reform and the Use of 
Ballot Initiatives to Effect that Change, 25 REV. LITIG. 575, 599 (2006) (defending the 
constitutionality of using public initiatives to change the method for allocating a state’s 
electoral votes).  Cf. Richard L. Hasen, When “Legislature” May Mean More than 
“Legislature”: Initiated Electoral College Reform and the Ghost of Bush v. Gore, 35 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 599, 629 (2008) (“A strict textual view suggests that initiated reform 
is unconstitutional; case law and policy arguments show the question is more uncertain.  
Reasonable judges could reach opposite conclusions on the question.”). 
 105  NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-1038(1) (2015).  
 106  ME. STAT. tit. 21-A, § 802 (2015).   
 107  FED. ELECTION COMM’N, FEDERAL ELECTIONS 2012: ELECTION RESULTS FOR THE 
U.S. PRESIDENT, THE U.S. SENATE, AND THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 28 (2013), 
http://www.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2012/federalelections2012.pdf.  
 108  Supra notes 105–06.  
 109  David Nir, Daily Kos Elections’ Presidential Results by Congressional District for 
the 2012 and 2008 Elections, DAILY KOS (Nov. 19, 2012, 12:30 PM), 
http://www.dailykos.com/story/2012/11/19/1163009/-Daily-Kos-Elections-presidential-
results-by-congressional-district-for-the-2012-2008-elections (specifying that Obama won 
41 of California’s 53 congressional districts, as well as the statewide vote, and Romney won 
12 congressional districts). 
 110  See RHODES COOK, AMERICA VOTES 30: 2011–2012 ELECTION RETURNS BY STATE 
10 (2014) (specifying that Obama won 60.2% of the statewide vote in California and 
Romney won 37.1%).  Approximately 2.7% of the popular vote was split among twelve 
third-party and independent candidates.  FED. ELECTION COMM’N, supra note 107, at 28.  
None of them received enough votes to be allotted an elector.  The “extra” electors that 
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instead have recommended various schemes for awarding a state’s electoral 
votes based on the outcome of the national popular vote.111 
In states that generally cast their electoral votes for a particular party’s 
candidate, politicians from that party likely could prevent the institutional 
legislature from changing the method for allocating electoral votes.  Under 
AIRC, activists and voters may use the initiative process to circumvent 
party bosses and ensure their state’s electoral votes more closely reflect the 
views of the state’s electorate as a whole.  Petitions for such initiatives 
were circulated in California in past election cycles, but none received 
enough signatures to be placed on the ballot.112  Particularly since 
initiatives often are introduced in off-year election cycles, when voter 
turnout is lower,113 it is reasonably possible that such a measure—like the 
Arizona initiative that gave rise to AIRC in the first place—might succeed.  
AIRC thus opens the door to potential realignments in presidential politics. 
III.     REMAINING QUESTIONS 
AIRC has reshaped Elections Clause doctrine and resolved several 
longstanding controversies concerning its meaning.114  This Part discusses 
some important questions that remain.  Section A argues that the Elections 
Clause should be read as imposing a special duty on state and federal courts 
to apply the plain meaning of state laws relating to federal elections.  
Section B questions whether Congress’s authority to regulate congressional 
elections is truly coextensive with its power to regulate congressional 
elections under the Elections Clause.  Section C discusses possible 
“commandeering” concerns with federal election statutes.  Finally, Section 
D examines implicit limits on the power the Elections Clause grants states 
to regulate congressional elections. 
 
neither Obama nor Romney won directly likely would have been split between Obama and 
Romney on a pro rata basis. 
 111  See, e.g., Vikram David Amar, Response, The Case for Reforming Presidential 
Elections by Subconstitutional Means: The Electoral College, the National Popular Vote 
Compact, and Congressional Power, 100 GEO. L.J. 237 (2011).   
 112  See, e.g., Memorandum from Katherine Montgomery, Initiative Program Manager, 
Cal. Sec’y of State, to All County Clerks/Registrars of Voters and Proponent (Feb. 2, 2011), 
elections.cdn.sos.ca.gov/ccrov/pdf/2011/february/11008km.pdf (transmitting official title 
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entitled Electoral Reform California).   
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(citing sources). 
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A.   Strict Statutory Construction and the Democracy Canon 
Perhaps the most significant Elections Clause doctrine the AIRC Court 
did not address is its requirement that both state and federal courts take 
special care to enforce the plain text of state election statutes, rather than 
applying their own judicial gloss or other doctrines, such as Professor Rick 
Hasen’s “Democracy Canon.”115 
As discussed throughout this Essay, the Elections Clause and 
Presidential Electors Clause are grants of constitutional authority to state 
legislatures—construed broadly by the AIRC Court as embracing any 
lawmaking entity or process authorized by a state’s constitution—rather 
than to states as a whole.  The Supreme Court has recognized that this 
specific delegation of authority imposes a special duty on other 
governmental entities to ensure that they apply election laws as written by 
the legislature, rather than with the flexibility and discretion they otherwise 
might be permitted to apply. 
In Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board, the Supreme Court 
observed that, “[a]s a general rule, [it] defers to a state court’s 
interpretation of a state statute.”116  When a legislature enacts a law 
regulating a presidential election, however, it is acting “by virtue of a direct 
grant of authority made under [the Presidential Electors Clause].”117  Laws 
enacted under the Presidential Electors Clause—and, by extension, the 
Elections Clause—require a special interpretive approach. 
Seven Justices went on to apply such an approach in Bush v. Gore.118  
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s concurrence, in which Justices Scalia and 
Thomas joined, stated that, when a legislature acts under the Presidential 
Electors Clause, “the text of the election law itself . . . takes on independent 
significance.”119  Courts have a unique duty to ensure they do not “depart[] 
from the statutory meaning” of such laws, even if they generally would 
have such interpretive power.120 
The four-Justice dissent written by Justice Souter echoed this 
sentiment, recognizing that the U.S. Supreme Court’s responsibility was to 
ensure that the Florida Supreme Court had not “displaced the state 
legislature’s” enactments, and that the “law as declared by the court” was 
not “different from the provisions made by the legislature, to which the 
 
 115  Hasen, supra note 15. 
 116  531 U.S. 70, 76 (2000) (per curiam). 
 117  Id.  
 118  531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).  
 119  Id. at 113 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).  
 120  Id. at 115.  
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National Constitution commits responsibility for determining how each 
State’s Presidential electors are chosen.”121 
Applying a super-strong plain meaning construction of laws regulating 
federal elections—indeed, all elections—promotes fair outcomes because it 
minimizes the opportunity for partisan manipulation.  Election laws are 
enacted before election disputes arise, behind at least a partial “veil of 
ignorance.”122  Because the legislature often will not know which candidate 
will benefit from a particular rule, there is an increased likelihood that the 
rule will be fair.123  When courts must interpret and apply the rule, 
particularly after an election is over, they generally know which candidates 
and political parties will benefit from different possible interpretations.  
There is a substantial risk that such knowledge may color courts’ views, 
leading to rulings that are at least partially outcome-driven.  Indeed, some 
courts have gone so far as to recognize that adopting an unexpected 
interpretation of the rules governing an election after-the-fact can amount 
to a due process violation.124  Limiting courts’ discretion to interpret 
election rules may ameliorate the possibility of their partisan bias 
improperly influencing the outcome of election litigation. 
B.   Federal Regulation of Presidential Elections 
Another issue the Elections Clause raises is whether Congress’s 
authority over presidential elections is coextensive with its power over 
congressional elections.  The Elections Clause expressly permits Congress 
to “make or alter” state election laws;125 the Presidential Electors Clause 
lacks analogous language.  The material difference in language between the 
Elections Clause and Presidential Electors Clause has not caused the 
Supreme Court pause, however.  Rather, the Court held that the federal 
government has inherent authority to regulate presidential elections.126  
This issue might be ripe for more careful consideration, however, in light 
 
 121  Id. at 130 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also Reform Party v. Black, 885 So. 2d 303, 
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406–07 (11th Cir. 1995) (holding that a state court’s construction of an election law contrary 
to its plain meaning violated voters’ constitutional rights).   
 122  JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 136 (1971).  
 123  Chad Flanders, Election Law Behind a Veil of Ignorance, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1369, 
1378–82 (2012). 
 124  Roe, 68 F.3d at 406–07; Griffin v. Burns, 570 F.2d 1065, 1078–79 (1st Cir. 1978).   
 125  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1.  
 126  See supra note 101; cf. Amar, supra note 111, at 260 (arguing that the Elections 
Clause empowers Congress to regulate presidential elections because congressional and 
presidential elections occur simultaneously, and rules concerning the latter may affect 
turnout for the former).   
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of the Court’s recent attention (such as it is) to the language and meaning 
of the clause, as well as the strict limits it has imposed on the scope of 
Congress’s power to enforce constitutional rights under Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.127 
C.   Commandeering and Federal Election Law 
The Court has yet to squarely address whether Printz’s anti-
commandeering prohibitions128 apply to laws enacted pursuant to the 
Elections Clause and whatever authority Congress might possess over 
presidential elections.  Nevertheless, it appears that anti-commandeering 
challenges to federal voting laws are unlikely to succeed. 
Printz held that it is “fundamentally incompatible with our 
constitutional system of dual sovereignty” for Congress to “command the 
States’ officers, or those of their political subdivisions, to administer or 
enforce a federal regulatory program.”129  It invalidated interim provisions 
of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act,130 enacted under the 
Commerce Clause,131 which required “state and local law enforcement 
officials to conduct background checks on prospective handgun 
purchasers.”132 
Over a century before Printz, the Court had held that state election 
officials may be called upon to “fulfil [sic] duties which they owe to the 
United States” in connection with federal elections.133  And in Branch v. 
Smith, a four-Justice plurality held that federal laws requiring state officials 
to engage in tasks relating to federal elections do not amount to 
unconstitutional commandeering, because they simply “regulat[e] (as the 
Constitution specifically permits) the manner in which a State is to fulfill 
its pre-existing constitutional obligations” under the Elections Clause.134  
That ruling drew a stinging dissent from Justices Thomas and O’Connor, 
who questioned the plurality’s refusal to apply Printz to the Elections 
Clause.135 
Many commentators have argued that the Elections Clause expressly 
authorizes commandeering of state officials, at least for congressional 
elections.  Commandeering proponents point out that the types of statutes 
 
 127  City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 128  Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997).  
 129  Id.  
 130  Pub. L. No. 103-159, § 102(a)(1), 107 Stat. 1536, 1536–39 (1993) (codified at 18 
U.S.C. § 922(s)(2), (s)(6)(B)–(C)), invalidated by Printz, 521 U.S. at 935. 
 131  Printz, 521 U.S. at 923–24. 
 132  Id. at 902.  
 133  Ex Parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 387 (1879).  
 134  538 U.S. 254, 280 (2003) (plurality opinion).   
 135  Id. at 301–02 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  
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the clause expressly authorizes Congress to enact necessarily must be 
implemented by state and local election officials.136  Consistent with this 
view, courts have rejected anti-commandeering challenges to the National 
Voter Registration Act (NVRA),137 which requires state officials to make 
voter registration forms available at certain public offices and proscribes 
detailed requirements for their processing.138  Paul McGreal, however, 
offers a persuasive argument that the Constitution’s “text, history, 
precedent, [and] structure,” as well as “prior government practice,” 
demonstrates that Congress may not commandeer state and local officials 
under the Elections Clause.139 
Other commentators140 sidestep the Elections Clause issue by 
contending that, even if Article I does not authorize Congress to 
commandeer state officials, it may do so when enacting laws under Section 
5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.141  The Court also has yet to directly 
address this theory.  Such an approach might be more persuasive than an 
argument under the Elections Clause itself, since the Fourteenth 
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Amendment abrogates state sovereignty in a variety of ways142 and, unlike 
the Elections Clause, applies equally to congressional and presidential 
elections.  Federal election laws would be subject to closer scrutiny, 
however, because Congress is not permitted to legislate under Section 5 
unless the statute is both congruent and proportional to a constitutional 
violation.143 
D.   Limits on State Authority 
A final Elections Clause issue that also remains for future resolution is 
the limit of states’ authority to enact laws concerning federal elections.  
States have no inherent power to regulate federal elections; their only 
power to do so comes from the Elections Clause and Presidential Elections 
Clause.144  The Court has explained that the Elections Clause grants states 
broad power to enact a “complete code for congressional elections,” 
concerning not only “times and places,” but also “notices, registration, 
supervision of voting, protection of voters, prevention of fraud and corrupt 
practices, counting of votes, duties of inspectors and canvassers, and 
making and publication of election returns.”145  It allows states “to enact 
the numerous requirements as to procedure and safeguards which 
experience shows are necessary in order to enforce the fundamental right 
involved.”146 
This broad delegation of authority is subject to implied limits not set 
forth in the Constitution’s text.  The Court has held that the Elections 
Clause is not “a source of power to dictate electoral outcomes, to favor or 
disfavor a class of candidates, or to evade important constitutional 
restraints.”147  States therefore lack power to enact laws governing 
congressional elections that fall into any of those categories.  The Court has 
applied this principle to invalidate state laws that attempted, directly or 
indirectly, to impose term limits for Congress.  In U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. 
Thornton, it struck down a statute prohibiting a candidate from appearing 
on the ballot if he or she already had served a specified number of terms in 
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the U.S. House or U.S. Senate, though the person could still run as a write-
in candidate.148 
Likewise, in Cook v. Gralike, it held unconstitutional a law that 
required negative messages to be printed on the ballot next to the names of 
candidates who refused to support a particular constitutional amendment 
imposing term limits for Congress.149  The Court explained that the 
provision “is plainly designed to favor candidates who are willing to 
support the particular form of a term limits amendment set forth in its text 
and to disfavor those who either oppose term limits entirely or would prefer 
a different proposal.”150  It added, “‘[B]y directing the citizen’s attention to 
the single consideration’ of the candidates’ fidelity to term limits, the labels 
imply that the issue ‘is an important—perhaps paramount—consideration 
in the citizen’s choice . . . .’”151  The Court concluded that such an attempt 
to “dictate electoral outcomes” is “not authorized by the Elections 
Clause.”152 
The Court has never enforced the Elections Clause’s implicit limits on 
states’ authority outside of the term limits context.  Its holding that states 
lack power to “dictate electoral outcomes” or “favor or disfavor a class of 
candidates”153 is potentially far-reaching, however.  Many facially neutral 
election laws may systematically benefit or hinder candidates from a 
particular party.  It is unclear whether the Elections Clause’s restriction on 
state power hinges on the intent of the legislature or the effects of a statute, 
and how closely the Court will scrutinize a law’s effects to determine 
whether it impermissibly affects an election’s outcomes.  Excluding 
candidates from the ballot, or printing derogatory warnings next to their 
names on the ballot, are direct and substantial handicaps specific to 
particular candidates.  It remains to be seen whether future Courts will 
enforce the Elections Clause’s implied restrictions broadly to prohibit other 
measures that might affect the outcome of an election, such as voter 
identification laws, absentee voting restrictions, or reductions in early 
voting periods. 
CONCLUSION 
The Elections Clause sits at a critical intersection of federalism, 
separation of powers, and constitutional rights.  It confers power on a 
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specific branch of state government, expressly authorizes federal 
preemption of state laws (if not federal commandeering of state 
officials154), and contemplates regulation of the fundamental constitutional 
right to vote.  While AIRC has largely settled questions concerning 
delegation of Elections Clause authority, the independent state legislature 
doctrine, and the permissibility of reallocating a state’s presidential electors 
through popular initiative (assuming the Presidential Electors Clause is 
read in pari materia), other important issues remain.  Perhaps most 
significantly, whether AIRC is viewed as a legal process or representation-
reinforcing ruling, the majority’s approach raises substantial questions 
about how far the Court will go in allowing the judiciary to preserve the 
fairness of federal elections and enforce the right to vote despite express 
textual grants of constitutional authority over the electoral system to 
Congress.  The Elections Clause thus serves not only as the constitutional 
basis for a range of election-related doctrines, but perhaps as a harbinger 
for the reinterpretation of other related provisions, as well. 
 
 
 154  See supra Section III.C.  
